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perception 
People have a strong tendency to judge themselves to be at 
lower risk than their peers for a wide variety of negative events 
such as developing heart disease, being injured in a car crash, and 
getting a divorce (e.g., Helweg-Larsen & Sheppard, 2001; Perloff 
& Fetzer, 1986; Price, Pentecost, & Voth, 2002; Weinstein, 1980, 
1987, 1989). We refer to this as comparative optimism.1 Although 
there is a sense in which this phenomenon is intuitive—nonpsy- 
chologists seem quite familiar with this kind of irrational, “It won’t 
happen to me” response—it has been surprisingly tricky for social 
and cognitive psychologists to explain satisfactorily (Weinstein & 
Klein, 1996). With the present research, we hope to add an 
important piece to this puzzle. 
Our proposal is that risk judgments about the average or typical 
member of a target group tend to increase as a continuous, roughly 
logarithmic function of the size of that group. In general, an 
individual is judged to be at lower risk than the average or typical 
member of a group of two, who in turn is judged to be at lower risk 
than the average or typical member of a group of three, and so on. 
Furthermore, we propose that this group size effect is the result of 
a simple, general cognitive mechanism that integrates the number 
of distinct elements in a stimulus into quantitative judgments about 
that stimulus (Pelham, Sumarta, & Myaskovsky, 1994). Under 
some conditions, this group size effect is enough to account for the 
typical comparative optimism effect because a risk judgment about 
oneself is a judgment about a small group and should, therefore, be 
relatively low, whereas a risk judgment about one’s average peer 
is  a  judgment  about  a  large  group  and  should,  therefore,  be 
relatively high. It is also consistent with the fact that individuals 
other than the self are judged to be at lower risk than their peers 
(e.g., Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), and it suggests a surprising reason 
(see Experiment 3) why comparative optimism for positive events 
tends to be weaker and less reliable than comparative optimism for 
negative events (e.g., Weinstein, 1980). The group size effect is 
also interesting because there is reason to believe that it extends 
1 We prefer the term comparative optimism to a number of synonyms 
that have appeared in the literature, including unrealistic optimism (e.g., 
Weinstein, 1980) and optimistic bias (e.g., Weinstein, 1989) All three 
terms refer to people judging their risk of experiencing negative life events 
to be lower than that of their peers and sometimes to people judging their 
likelihood of experiencing positive life events to be higher than that of their 
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well beyond the domain of risk judgment (see especially Experi- 
ment 5) and that it has important implications for social judgment 
more generally. 
In the rest of this study, we review our initial work on the group 
size effect on memory-based judgments of heart attack risk. We 
then consider some alternative explanations of this phenomenon 
before presenting a series of experiments that replicate the group 
size effect for a variety of online risk judgments and a variety of 
negative events. In this empirical work, we also introduce several 
manipulations and methodological variations that help distinguish 
among the competing theories of the group size effect. Ultimately, 
we return to the issue of the group size effect’s role in comparative 
optimism and in social judgment more generally. 
 
The Group Size Effect 
Price (2001) originally hypothesized that risk judgments are 
subject to a group size effect. He noted that previous research had 
shown that when people make risk judgments about themselves 
and about another specific individual, as opposed to their average 
peer, the magnitude of comparative optimism is greatly reduced. 
For example, Perloff and Fetzer (1986) found that college students 
judged their own risk to be lower than that of the average college 
student and the average person but roughly the same as that of their 
closest friend, same-sex parent, and a sibling (for similar results, 
see also Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 
1995; Harris & Middleton, 1994; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996; 
Regan, Snyder, & Kassin, 1995; see Hoorens & Buunk, 1993, for 
a null result). Price also noted limited evidence that risk judgments 
increase as a continuous function of target group size. Specifically, 
Whitley and Hern (1991) found that college women judged the 
pregnancy risk of their best friend to be about the same as their 
own, the pregnancy risk of the average college woman to be 
greater, and the pregnancy risk of the average woman to be greater 
still (see also Burger & Burns, 1988). None of these results had 
previously been interpreted as an effect of group size per se. 
Instead, they were interpreted as indicating differences in how 
people think about individuals versus groups (Klar et al., 1996), 
specific versus generalized targets (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995), or 
targets that are more or less similar to themselves (e.g., Whitley & 
Hern, 1991). 
To demonstrate a true group size effect and to rule out 
alternative interpretations of it, Price (2001) abandoned the 
correlational approach typically used in research on comparative 
optimism in favor of an experimental paradigm adapted from 
research on category learning and frequency judgment. 
Participants read a series of heart attack risk profiles for 
individual employees at different fictional businesses. These risk 
profiles were simple descriptions of the employees in terms of 
eight binary risk factors for having a heart attack (e.g., blood 
pressure: high vs. low). This allowed for the manipulation of 
both group size (number of employees at a business) and 
objective risk of the average group member (average number 
of high-risk features), and also for the control of potential 
confounding variables. He found that participants’ risk 
judgments were sensitive to the objective risk of the individuals 
but also that the judged risk of the typical employee increased 
as a function of group size regardless of the objective risk. For 
example, in one experiment, participants judged the risk of the 
typical employee to be greater as the number of employees 
increased from one to five to nine but in a negatively accelerated 
way. Although participants in these experiments did not judge their 
own risk of having a heart attack, the implications of the group size 
effect for comparative optimism are straightforward. Because the 
self is a very small group, it should tend to be judged at lower risk 
than the average peer (a very large group), independently of 
motivated or nonmotivated differences in how people think about 
themselves versus their peers. 
 
Possible Explanations of the Group Size Effect 
Price (2001) originally suggested that the group size effect 
might be a cognitive phenomenon that depends on how people 
attend to, store, retrieve, and integrate information, and he pre- 
sented a quantitative model based on Fiedler’s (1996) Brunswikian 
Induction Algorithm for Social Cognition (BIAS) framework for 
understanding social judgment. This model featured the following 
assumptions. (a) People encode in memory each individual in 
terms of that individual’s risk factors, although with a certain 
amount of random error; (b) they are especially likely to encode 
high-risk features (e.g., high blood pressure); (c) at the time of 
judgment, they mentally average their representations of the 
individuals; and (d) their judgment is based on the match between 
their mental average and the prototype of a high-risk 
individual. The important implication of this model is that the 
mental average comes to match the high-risk prototype more 
closely as the number of individuals increases. This is because of 
both the selective encoding of high-risk features and the 
canceling of random error with increasing group size (see Price, 
2001, for details). Alternatively, Price suggested that people 
might base their risk judgments in part on the judged frequency 
of high-risk individuals or high- risk features in the group. We 
refer to these three cognitive explanations as the BIAS theory, 
the high-risk individual theory, and the high-risk feature theory. 
Another kind of cognitive explanation, not originally considered 
by Price (2001), is that people base their risk judgments in part on 
the total number of individuals in the group. This is consistent with 
two different lines of research. First, Pelham et al. (1994) have 
argued that people often use a numerosity heuristic to make 
quantitative judgments. That is, they use the number of distinct 
elements in a stimulus as a cue to judging other quantitative 
dimensions of that stimulus. Although this makes sense in many 
situations (e.g., the number of slices of pizza on the table is a good 
indicator of the total amount of pizza), it can sometimes be 
misleading. For example, Pelham et al. (1994) found that people 
estimated the area of a circle to be greater when it was divided into 
eight separate wedges than when it was presented intact and to 
estimate the sum of eight small numbers to be greater than the sum 
of four larger numbers when, in fact, the two sums were the same. 
It seems plausible, therefore, that people might use the number of 
people in a group as a cue to judging the risk of the average group 
member. Second, Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996) 
have demonstrated a phenomenon they call basic anchoring, in 
which an irrelevant number is integrated with a quantitative 
judgment made shortly after processing that irrelevant number. 
For example, in one study, participants’ judgments of the 
number of physicians listed in the local telephone book were 
influenced by an identification number that they had previously 
been assigned and asked to think minimally about. It seems 
plausible that the number 
 
 
of individuals in a group might serve as a kind of basic anchor, 
which is integrated with people’s risk judgments. We return to 
consider these processes in more detail in the General Discussion. 
For now, however, we refer to the general idea that people’s 
judgments are influenced by the total number of individuals as the 
numerosity theory. 
Another kind of explanation for the group size effect is based on 
affective approaches to understanding risk perception (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). It is 
well known that people can have quick, automatic, even 
unconscious affective reactions to a variety of stimuli (Zajonc, 
2000). It is also well known that such affective reactions can 
influence a wide range of evaluative judgments about those 
stimuli (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Zajonc, 2000). It is possible, then, 
that people have a negative affective reaction to thinking about 
other people’s risk for negative events and that this negative 
affective reaction is reflected in high risk judgments. If we 
assume further that the strength of this negative affective 
reaction increases as a function of group size, then the group 
size effect follows. Why would the strength of the negative 
affective reaction increase as a function of group size? One 
possibility is that people accurately perceive that the absolute 
number of individuals in the group to whom the event will happen 
increases as a function of group size. For example, people 
might reasonably assume that a certain individual will not have a 
heart attack and, therefore, not experience much of a negative 
affective reaction. However, when considering a group of 10, 
people might reasonably assume that they are considering a 
minimum of three or four future heart attack victims, producing a 
stronger negative affective reaction. Another possibility is that 
people have an affective reaction that is proportional to the number 
of high-risk features or high-risk individuals that they perceive in 
the group as a whole. We refer to this general category of 
explanation as the affective theory. 
A final explanation is that the group size effect is an example (or 
perhaps generalization) of the person-positivity bias in evaluative 
social judgment. Sears (1983) observed that individuals tend to be 
evaluated more positively than the groups to which they belong. 
He proposed that this is because people perceive themselves to be 
more similar to individuals than to groups, which in turn results in 
their liking individuals more than groups (see also Miller & 
Felicio, 1990; see Nilsson & Ekehammar, 1987, for a null result). 
It is this difference in liking that causes them to evaluate 
individuals more positively than groups. Given these assumptions, 
it seems plausible that people might perceive the average member 
of a larger group to be less similar to themselves, like that 
comparison target less, and therefore judge that comparison 
target to be at greater risk (see also Hoorens & Buunk, 1993; 
Regan et al., 1995). 
 
Indirect Versus Direct Comparative Judgments 
Before proceeding, we should discuss an important 
methodological issue, partly for the sake of clarity but also 
because, as we have noted elsewhere (Price et al., 2002), this 
particular methodological detail can have a major impact on the 
empirical and theoretical conclusions one draws about 
comparative optimism. 
As many researchers have noted, comparative optimism is fairly 
robust across two basic measurement methods (Klar et al., 1996; 
Otten & Van der Pligt, 1996; Price et al., 2002; Weinstein & Klein, 
1996). In the indirect method, participants make two separate risk 
judgments: one for themselves and one for their peers. The re- 
searchers then take the difference between the two judgments, 
generally finding that the self-risk judgments are considerably 
lower than the peer-risk judgments. (It would also make sense for 
the researchers to take the ratio of the two judgments, but this is 
not typically done; Klar & Ayal, 2004.) This difference can be 
taken either between subjects or, more commonly, within subjects. 
Not surprisingly, the within-subjects effect is generally stronger 
(Otten & Van der Pligt, 1996). In the direct method, participants 
make a single judgment of their own risk relative to that of their 
peers. For example, they might judge their risk on a 7-point 
numerical scale, with 4 said to represent their average peer’s risk. 
These judgments are generally lower than 4 (or whatever response 
is specified as the peers’ risk), again indicating comparative 
optimism. 
In the present research, we focus on the indirect method rather 
than the direct method. This is because the group size effect 
hypothesis most clearly implies an effect on comparative optimism 
using this method. The difference between participants’ peer-risk 
and self-risk judgments should increase as a function of 
comparison group size because their peer-risk judgments should 
increase and their self-risk judgments should remain constant 
(and relatively low). There are also theoretical reasons to 
believe that the direct method might produce a weaker or even 
null group size effect. Specifically, a number of researchers 
have suggested that, in making direct comparative judgments, 
people pay relatively little attention to the comparison group 
(Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Kruger, 
1999; Price et al., 2002). For now, we leave open the possibility 
that indirect and direct comparative judgments might be 
affected differently by group size, although we included a 
direct condition in one experiment (Experiment 2) and found 
strong initial evidence for a group size effect even there. 
 
The Present Experiments 
 
We conducted the present experiments with three major goals in 
mind. The first was to replicate the group size effect using different 
stimuli (e.g., photographs of people rather than written feature 
lists), different negative life events, and different measurement 
methods from those of Price (2001). Our second goal was to show 
more conclusively that group size can be a contributor to 
comparative optimism, and how big a contributor it is, by 
asking participants to judge their own risk in addition to or 
compared with that of the average member of groups of different 
sizes. An interesting question is whether people judge 
themselves to be at lower risk than other individuals or 
whether comparative optimism is ob- served only when the 
comparison target is a group. The results of previous research on 
this particular question have been somewhat ambiguous (Harris 
& Middleton, 1994; Hoorens & Buunk, 1993; Klar et al., 1996; 
Regan et al., 1995). Note that the presence of a comparative 
optimism effect when the comparison target is an- other 
individual would imply that comparative optimism cannot be 
entirely reduced to a group size effect. Our third goal was to 
evaluate potential explanations of the group size effect by varying 
our experimental design and procedure in several ways that are 
explained in the relevant Method sections. 
 
 
Experiment 1 
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate the group 
size effect demonstrated by Price (2001) using a wider variety of 
negative events (not just having a heart attack) and, more 
importantly, using photographs of people as stimuli (rather than 
written descriptions). Specifically, participants saw photographs 
of groups of 1, 5, 10, and 15 peers and judged the risk that 
various negative events would happen to the average group 
member. We hypothesized that risk judgments would increase 
as a function of target group size. We also asked participants to 
judge their own risk for the same negative life events so that we 
could (a) determine whether they judge themselves to be at lower 
risk than other stimulus individuals and (b) show definitively 
that comparative optimism, measured by the indirect method, 
increases as a function of comparison group size. 
Note that this experiment has theoretical implications too, 
especially for explanations that emphasize selective memory for 
high-risk features or high-risk individuals, including the BIAS 
theory. Such explanations suggest that the experimental procedure 
of Price (2001) would be particularly likely to produce a group size 
effect. One reason is that the encoding and retrieval of stimulus 
individuals in terms of specific risk factors would be encouraged, 
if not demanded, by the fact that the individual employees were 
described by lists of specific risk factors. A second reason is that 
the risk judgments were memory based, so that the selective 
encoding and retrieval of high-risk information would be likely to 
affect them. In contrast, in this experiment (and all the others 
presented here), the risk judgments were made online, with all 
high-risk and low-risk stimulus information equally available at 
the time of judgment. Also, this information was not conveniently 
presented as lists of risk factors. We believe that a group size effect 
under such conditions would provide evidence against 
explanations that rely on selective memory. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 60 undergraduate students at 
California State University, Fresno (CSUF). They participated as part 
of an introductory psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli. We took digital photographs of 30 different young adults, 
including advanced psychology students at CSUF and nonstudent friends 
and acquaintances of the experimenters. There were 16 women and 14 
men, who were at least somewhat representative of the racial diversity of 
CSUF students and the local community. Each photograph featured the 
individual in his or her everyday clothing, standing informally and facing 
forward. We digitally removed the backgrounds from the photographs and 
printed them onto standard overhead transparencies for presentation. 
Specifically, we divided the photographs into two groups of 15 individuals 
and printed each group, organized into three rows of five, onto a 
transparency. We also divided each group of 15 into separate groups of 5 
and 10 (individuals in the first row vs. those in the second and third 
rows) and printed them onto separate transparencies. Finally, we printed a 
photograph of each of the 30 individuals onto a separate transparency. 
This allowed us to use a standard overhead projector to present our 
participants with the 30 individuals separately, along with the same 30 
individuals organized into mutually exclusive groups of 5, 10, and 15. 
Furthermore, we could present two different groupings of the 30 
individuals into groups of 5, 10, and 15 to help control for the effects of 
how specific stimulus individuals were assigned to groups. 
Design and procedure. Participants were tested in non-interacting 
groups of 5 to 10 in a classroom on the university campus. Half of these 
groups were randomly assigned to the groups-first condition and the rest to 
the groups-last condition. In the groups-first condition (n = 35), 
participants judged the risk of the average member of the groups of 5, 10, 
and 15 for each of four events (developing cancer, being injured in a 
car crash, breaking a bone, and becoming alcoholic), and then they judged 
the risk of each of the individuals for the same four events. In the 
groups-last condition (n = 25), they judged the risk of each of the 30 
individuals first and then they judged the risk of the average member of 
the groups of 5, 10, and 
15. Within each session, both the individuals and the groups of 5, 10, and 
15 were presented in different randomized orders. Also, each of the two 
alternative groupings of the 30 individuals was used for roughly half the 
sessions. 
Participants made their risk judgments using a 101-point numerical risk 
scale (0 = lowest possible risk, 50 = moderate risk, 100 = highest possible 
risk). Participants sat at classroom desks positioned roughly 5 to 7 m from 
a projection screen, and an overhead projector displayed the stimulus 
images on the screen. The images were large and clear enough for 
participants to see easily, including specific features of the individuals that 
might be relevant to their risk judgments (e.g., sex of the person, style of 
dress). Each individual or group was presented for however long it took 
all participants to make all four risk judgments, usually not more than 
30 s. They wrote their risk judgments on a separate response sheet. After 
making all of their peer-risk judgments, participants completed a self-
risk questionnaire, again using the 101-point numerical risk scale, for the 
same four events. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
For each participant, we computed the mean risk judgment 
across the 30 individuals and four events to arrive at a mean 
individual peer-risk judgment. Also, for each participant, we 
computed the mean risk judgment for the groups of 5, 10, and 15 
across the four events to arrive at three mean group-risk 
judgments. Figure 1 presents the means of these four mean risk 
judgments as a function of the logarithm of the group size, 
separately for participants in the groups-first and groups-last 
conditions. (Stan- 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean peer-risk judgments as a function of the logarithm of the 
group size for Experiment 1, both when the stimulus groups preceded the 
individuals (the groups-first condition) and vice versa (the groups-last 
condition). Each regression line can be interpreted either as the line that 
best fits the four means or as the line defined by the mean regression 
coefficient and the mean regression constant taken across participants in 
that condition. The stimuli were photographs of real peers. The risk 
judgments were made on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
 
dard deviations for all experiments appear in Table 1.2) It appears 
from Figure 1 that there was a group size effect for participants in 
the groups-first condition but little or no effect for participants in 
the groups-last condition. 
We wanted to analyze these results further within a regression 
framework to emphasize the roughly log-linear form of the group 
size effect. To do so, we used a procedure suggested by Lorch and 
Myers (1990) for repeated measures experimental designs. 
Specifically, we regressed each participant’s four mean risk 
judgments (for individuals and for groups of 5, 10, and 15) onto 
the logarithm of the group size, obtaining a regression coefficient 
for each participant. A positive regression coefficient indicates a 
group size effect, and the consistency of these coefficients across 
participants indicates the reliability of the effect. We found 
that the mean regression coefficient (M = 2.92, SD = 4.28) 
was significantly greater than 0, indicating an overall group size 
effect, t(59) = 5.29, p < .05. However, the mean regression 
coefficient in the groups- 
 
 
Table 1 
Standard Deviations of Judgments in Experiments 1 through 5 
 
 
Comparison group size 
first condition (M = 4.80, SD = 4.65) was significantly greater 
than the mean regression coefficient in the groups-last condition 
(M = 0.29, SD = 1.43), t(58) = 4.69, p < .05, the latter of which 
was not significantly different from 0, t(24) = 1.02, ns. This entire 
pattern  of  significant  and  nonsignificant  results  was  replicated 
when we reanalyzed the data excluding the individual peer 
judgments, showing that this is a group size effect rather than an 
effect of whether the comparison target is an individual versus a 
group. One potential explanation for the order effect is that, in 
making their risk judgments about the groups, participants in the 
groups- last condition recalled the risk judgments that they had 
already made about the individuals. This may have changed their 
strategy from one of forming a holistic impression of the risk of 
the average person in the group to one of mentally averaging the 
numerical risk ratings that they had already made. Because 
people have been shown to be fairly unbiased at estimating the 
mean of a series of numbers (Peterson & Beach, 1967), this 
strategy would not be expected to produce a group size effect. 
Alternatively, this could be  a  mental  set  effect,  in  which  
participants  simply  continue making judgments that are much 
like the large number of judgments they have already made. 
Support for these interpretations comes from the fact that 
participants in both conditions produced relatively  low  
individual  peer-risk  judgments  and  that  in  the groups-last  
condition  they  produced  similarly  low  group-risk 
judgments. 
Finally, participants judged themselves (M = 33.16, SD = 
17.30) to be at lower risk than even their individual peers, t(56) = 
3.35, p < .05.3 Because participants’ peer-risk judgments in- 
creased as a function of comparison group size, we can also say 
that comparative optimism increased as a function of comparison 
group size, at least in the groups-first condition. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Negative events 
Riskb 
Sim.d 
Positive events 
Riskb 
Sim.d 
Neutral events 
Riskb 
Sim.d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 4e 
 
Both the studies of Price (2001) and Experiment 1 here have 
demonstrated that group size affects absolute peer-risk judgments 
and, therefore, comparative optimism using the indirect method. 
As described previously, however, there is another common way 
of measuring comparative optimism: the direct method (Klar et al., 
1996; Price et al., 2002; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). In the direct 
method, participants make a single comparative risk judgment 
rather than two absolute risk judgments. For example, they might 
judge their own risk compared with that of their average peer on a 
7-point scale, where 4 is said to be the risk of their average peer. 
Peer risk 1.55 1.26 1.48 1.45 
Experiment 5f 
Height 9.09    7.58 6.51 6.86 
Note. All risk and likelihood judgments were averaged across multiple 
events and, when the group size was 1, across multiple comparison targets. 
The comparison group sizes differed across the six experiments, account- 
ing for the missing cells in the table. The standard deviations of the self-
judgments are presented in the text. Sim. = similarity. 
A mean rating lower than 4 across a group of participants, there- 
fore, indicates comparative optimism. 
However, would the group size effect contribute to comparative 
optimism measured by the direct method? There is reason to 
believe that it might not. Specifically, many researchers have 
argued that direct comparative judgments are based almost exclu- 
sively on what people think about themselves. This might be why, 
for example, people judge themselves to be friendlier than average. 
a Risk judgments were made on a 101-point numerical scale.    b Risk and    
likelihood judgments were made on a 7-point verbal scale. c Direct 
comparative risk judgments were made on a 7-point verbal scale, with 4 
representing the risk of the average comparison group member. d Simi- 
larity judgments were made on a 6-point verbal similarity scale. e Risk 
judgments were made on a 9-point scale. fHeight judgments were made in 
scale feet and inches and converted to scale inches. 
2 We have chosen to present the standard deviations for all five exper- 
iments in a single table rather than as error bars in the figures because this 
makes the figures much easier to read. 
3 Three participants were not included in this analysis because they 
failed to make self-risk judgments. 
Condition/judgment 1 4 5 8 10 12 15 
  Experiment 1a     
Groups first 14.29 15.34  14.05  15.76 
Groups last 12.53 15.66  16.21  14.47 
  Experiment 2     
Indirect/peerb 0.96 1.01 1.12  1.09  
Directc 0.72 0.76 0.84  0.88  
  Experiment 3     
 
0.59 0.96 0.79 0.90 
0.81 1.31 1.21 1.28 
0.61 1.03 0.88 0.92 
0.85 1.46 1.22 1.00 
0.57 0.96 0.90 0.94 
0.94 1.44 1.48 1.38 
 
 
 
Most people are friendly and, therefore, judge themselves to be 
relatively friendly without considering the fact that, again, most 
people are friendly (Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999). This 
may also be why people judge themselves to be better than average 
at easy tasks (e.g., riding a bicycle) but worse than average at 
difficult tasks (e.g., juggling). Most people are good at riding a 
bicycle, so they judge themselves to be relatively good, and most 
people are bad at juggling, so they judge themselves to be 
relatively bad. In both cases, they fail to consider the fact that 
their peers tend to be about as good or bad as themselves 
(Kruger, 1999). Price et al. (2002) have applied this argument to 
risk judgments after showing that people’s absolute self-risk 
judgments are almost perfect predictors of their direct 
comparative risk judgments; their absolute peer-risk judgments 
account for very little additional variance (see also Eiser et al., 
2001). All of this implies that direct comparative risk judgments 
might not be subject to the group size effect. If people do not 
consider their peers when making direct comparative judgments, 
then the number of peers that constitute the comparison group 
should not matter. If this were true, then the group size effect 
would not contribute to comparative optimism measured using the 
direct method. 
For this reason, we conducted Experiment 2 with two 
conditions. The indirect condition was essentially a replication 
of Experiment 1, although we intermixed trials on which 
individuals were presented and trials on which groups were 
presented so that order was not an issue. In the direct condition, 
participants judged their own risk compared with that of the 
comparison target. Again, if people generally disregard the 
comparison target when making direct comparative judgments, 
then the direct condition should fail to reveal a group size effect. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 156 undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Irvine. They participated as part of an 
introductory psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli. We used 28 of the 30 photographs used in Experiment 1 (14 
women and 14 men), organizing them into seven matched sets of 4 (each 
containing 2 men and 2 women). The matching variable was the mean risk 
judgment across three events (breaking a bone, developing cancer, and 
becoming alcoholic) assigned to the stimulus individuals by participants in 
Experiment 1. We randomly chose one set of 4 to serve as stimulus 
individuals (i.e., 4 separate groups of 1), one set to serve as a group of 4, 
two sets combined to serve as a group of 8, and the remaining sets 
combined to serve as a group of 12. This constituted Photo Grouping A. 
We then recombined the seven sets of 4 to obtain Photo Grouping B. For 
example, the set that served as the 4 stimulus individuals in Grouping A 
was part of the group of 12 in Grouping B. This allowed us to present each 
participant with photographs of 4 stimulus individuals, a group of 4, a 
group of 8, and a group of 12 in one of two different ways and such that 
the groups were roughly matched on the overall perceived risk of the 
individuals in the groups. 
Design and procedure. The design and procedure were similar to those 
of Experiment 1, but we varied them in a few ways. First, we used only 
three negative events: breaking a bone, developing cancer, and becoming 
alcoholic. Second, participants made 21 risk judgments, each on a separate 
trial. On each trial, we presented participants with one photograph and 
asked them to make a risk judgment about one event. We established a 
basic order for the 21 trials, in which each of the seven stimulus photo- 
graphs (4 individuals, a group of 4, a group of 8, and a group of 12) was 
presented once within each of the first, second, and third blocks of seven 
trials. Within each block, photographs of individuals and groups were 
alternated, but the exact order differed from block to block. The event in 
question also changed from trial to trial, with no event appearing more than 
three times in a block, and in such a way that each of the seven stimulus 
photographs was paired once with each of the three events. Of course, we 
varied which photo grouping (A or B) that we used from session to session, 
but we also varied the basic order of the trials by reversing it for partici- 
pants in roughly half the sessions. 
The most important difference from Experiment 1, however, was that 
participants in half the sessions were assigned to the indirect condition and 
the rest to the direct condition. Participants in the indirect condition (n = 
78) judged the risk, on each trial, that the target would experience the event 
in question. For each stimulus photograph, an experimenter read the risk 
question aloud (e.g., “What is the risk of [this student/the average student 
in this group] for becoming alcoholic?”), and participants marked their 
judgments on a separate response sheet. After making the 21 peer-risk 
judgments, participants then judged their own risk for each of the three 
events. The response scale for both the peer-risk and self-risk judgments 
was a 7-point verbal risk scale: extremely low (1), somewhat low (2), 
slightly low (3), moderate (4), slightly high (5), somewhat high (6), ex- 
tremely high (7). Participants in the direct condition (n = 78) judged their 
own risk, on each trial, compared with that of the comparison target for the 
event in question. Again, for each stimulus photograph, an experimenter 
read the risk question aloud (e.g., “Compared with the risk of [this 
student/the average student in this group], what is your risk for becoming 
alcoholic?”), and participants marked their judgments on a separate 
response sheet. The response scale was a 7-point verbal scale ranging 
from much lower risk (1) to much higher risk (7). The midpoint of the 
scale was same as [this student/the average student in this group] (4). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Indirect condition. For each participant in the indirect 
condition, we computed the mean individual peer-risk judgment 
across the four individuals and three events, and we computed 
the mean group-risk judgment for the 4-, 8-, and 12-member 
groups across the three events. Figure 2 presents the means of 
these four mean risk judgments as a function of the logarithm 
of the group size. Again, we regressed the four mean risk 
judgments onto the logarithm of the group size, obtaining a 
regression coefficient for each participant. The mean regression 
coefficient (M = 0.35, SD = 0.47) was significantly greater 
than 0, t(77) = 6.59, p < .05, indicating a group size effect, 
which remained even when the individual peer-risk judgments 
were excluded from the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean peer-risk judgments (indirect condition) and comparative 
risk judgments (direct condition) as a function of the logarithm of the group 
size for Experiment 2. The stimuli were photographs of real peers. Both 
types of judgment were made on a 7-point verbal scale. 
 
 
Note that the mean regression coefficient is much lower here than 
in Experiment 1 because the response scale ranged from 1 to 7 
rather than 0 to 100. In both cases, however, the mean was more 
than half a standard deviation above 0, so the effects were 
commensurate. Also as in Experiment 1, the group size effect 
did not completely account for comparative optimism because 
participants’ judged themselves to be at lower risk (M = 2.89, 
SD = 0.89) than other individuals, t(77) = 3.36, p < .05. This 
means that, as the group size increased, so did the discrepancy 
between participants’ self-risk and peer-risk judgments: their 
level of comparative optimism. 
Direct condition. For each participant in the direct condition, 
we computed the mean comparative risk judgment across the three 
events when the comparison target was an individual and when the 
comparison target was a group of 4, 8, and 12. Figure 2 also 
presents the means of these four mean comparative risk judgments. 
Note that these judgments decrease as a roughly linear function of 
the logarithm of the group size. In other words, as the comparison 
group increased in size, participants judged their own risk to be 
farther below that of the average member of the comparison group. 
This is exactly what the existence of the group size effect would 
lead us to expect. The average member of a larger group appears 
to be at greater risk, so people judge their own risk to be farther 
below that standard. 
Again, for each participant, we regressed the four mean 
comparative risk judgments onto the logarithm of the group size, 
obtaining a regression coefficient for each participant. The mean 
regression coefficient was significantly less than 0 (M = -0.09, 
SD = 0.25), confirming that there was a group size effect, t(77) = 
3.18, p < .05. The effect remained when the judgments individual 
peer-risk were excluded from the analysis. As usual, even though 
group size contributed to comparative optimism, it did not 
completely account for it. Even when the comparison target was 
another individual, participants’ comparative risk judgments (M = 
3.32, SD = 0.72) were significantly lower than 4, t(77) = 8.37, 
p < .05. 
The existence of a group size effect in the direct condition is 
interesting for several reasons. First, it suggests that comparative 
optimism measured by the direct method, as well as comparative 
optimism measured by the indirect method, might generally reflect 
an effect of group size. Second, although the effect of group size 
on absolute peer-risk judgments is to increase them, the effect on 
direct comparative judgments is to decrease them (i.e., to move 
them further below the midpoint of the scale). This shows that the 
group size effect does not involve a simple translation of more 
group members into higher judgments. Instead, group size seems 
to affect people’s subjective impression of the risk of the average 
comparison group member, which in turn becomes input into the 
direct comparative judgment process. Finally, these results are 
only partly consistent with theorizing on the difference between 
indirect and direct comparative judgments (Eiser et al., 2001; Klar, 
2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Kruger, 1999; Price et al., 2002). 
It is clearly not the case that participants completely disregarded 
the comparison target in making direct comparative risk 
judgments, because they were influenced by the size of the 
comparison group. In contrast, the group size effect on direct 
comparative judgments was not as strong as the group size 
effect on absolute peer-risk judgments. To show this, we 
reversed the sign of all the regression coefficients in the direct 
condition and compared their 
mean (now positive) with that of the regression coefficients in the 
indirect condition. The difference was statistically significant, 
t(154) = 4.39, p < .05. This is consistent with the idea that people 
attended less to the comparison target when making direct 
comparative judgments than when making indirect 
comparative judgments. 
 
Experiment 3 
It is clear from the first two experiments that the group size 
effect does not depend on the specific design and procedure used 
by Price (2001) in his original demonstration. Because these 
experiments show a group size effect on online risk judgments 
with stimulus individuals that are not conveniently presented as 
lists of discrete risk factors, explanations hinging on the 
assumption of selective memory for high-risk features or 
individuals are implausible. Next, we turn our attention to 
explanations that do not necessarily assume selective memory for 
specific features or individuals. These include the affective 
theory, the person-positivity theory, and the numerosity theory. 
The manipulation that we introduce in Experiment 3 is that 
participants in one condition make risk judgments as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Participants in two other conditions judge 
the likelihood that the average group member, and they 
themselves, will experience various positive or neutral events. 
Research on comparative optimism has shown not only that 
people tend to judge themselves to be less likely than their peers to 
experience negative events but also that they judge themselves to 
be more likely than their peers to experience positive events (e.g., 
Hoorens, 1996; Weinstein, 1980). We have seen that comparative 
optimism for negative events increases as a function of group size. 
However, what will happen for positive events? There are two 
distinct possibilities. One is that comparative optimism for positive 
events will also increase as a function of group size. This requires, 
however, that the group size effect reverse direction so that larger 
groups are judged less likely to experience the events. Note that 
this would be consistent with the person-positivity theory of the 
group size effect. If larger groups are perceived to be less similar 
to the self and, therefore, are liked less, then larger groups should 
be judged to be both more likely to experience negative events, as 
we know that they are, and less likely to experience positive 
events. 
The second possibility is that comparative optimism for positive 
events will decrease as a function of group size. This would 
happen if larger groups were judged to be more likely to 
experience positive events, just as they are judged to be more 
likely to experience negative events. This result would be 
consistent with the more general affective theory of the group 
size effect. According to this theory, when the event is 
negative, people feel more negatively about larger groups, which 
contain more potential victims or losers, and therefore judge the 
average group member to be more likely to experience the event. 
Generalizing to positive events, people feel more positively 
about a larger group, which contains more potential winners, 
and again judge the average group member to be more likely 
to experience the event. For example, people might perceive 
more potential award winners in a larger group, feel more 
positively about the group as a whole, and therefore judge the 
likelihood that the average group member will win an award to 
be greater. If this were the case, it would not be 
 
 
surprising to observe an asymmetry between the effect sizes for 
negative and positive events. Reviews have shown convincingly 
that across a wide range of situations negative affect tends to be 
elicited more easily and experienced more intensely than positive 
affect (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin 
& Royzman, 2001). For this reason, the group size effect for 
negative events might be stronger than the group size effect for 
positive events. The important point, however, is that the person- 
positivity and general affective theories make directly opposing 
predictions about what will happen with positive events. 
What about neutral events? Neither the person-positivity theory 
nor the general affective theory implies a group size effect for 
neutral events. One reason is that neutral events should not elicit 
either positive or negative affect, meaning there would be no 
affective response to grow in magnitude as a function of group 
size. Another is that even if larger groups tend to elicit greater 
negative affect regardless of the valence of the event (as in the 
person-positivity theory), this negative affect would probably not 
influence the likelihood judgment because it would be interpreted 
as irrelevant to it. This is because affect generally influences 
judgment only to the extent that it can be interpreted as being 
relevant to the judgment (Martin, 2000; Schwarz, 1990; Zajonc, 
2000). For example, it seems reasonable to think that people might 
interpret negative affect as indicating that the group members they 
are considering are relatively likely to die early or relatively 
unlikely to win an award. However, what would such negative 
affect imply about the likelihood that they will some day own a 
white car or subscribe to a magazine? Our assumption is that it 
would imply nothing and, therefore, fail to influence those 
judgments. 
Now consider the numerosity theory. Pelham et al. (1994) have 
shown quite convincingly that people use stimulus numerosity as 
a cue to a wide variety of quantitative judgments, and Wilson et al. 
(1996) have shown that people sometimes integrate an irrelevant 
number into their frequency judgments. Both of these results 
suggest that a larger group might be judged more likely to 
experience negative events, positive events, and neutral events. 
Furthermore, barring ceiling effects, the numerosity theory 
suggests that the group size effect should be equally strong 
regardless of the valence of the event. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 68 undergraduate students at 
CSUF. They participated as part of an introductory psychology course 
requirement. 
Design and procedure. Participants judged the likelihood that each of 
eight events would happen to each of 5 stimulus individuals and to the 
average member of three different-sized groups: 5, 10, and 15. The stim- 
ulus photographs were those used in Experiment 1, and the 5 stimulus 
individuals were a randomly selected subset of the entire set of 30 photo- 
graphs that was varied from session to session. The individuals and groups 
were presented as in Experiment 1, with the individual-group order and the 
order of the groups counterbalanced across experimental sessions. 
Judgments were made on a 7-point likelihood scale like the risk scale 
used in the indirect condition of Experiment 2, except that the word 
chance was added to all the response alternatives (e.g., extremely low 
became extremely low chance). After making all eight likelihood 
judgments for a comparison target, participants judged the similarity of 
the target to themselves on a 6-point verbal scale ranging from 
extremely dissimilar to me (1) to extremely similar to me (6). Finally, 
after making judgments about all the 
individuals and groups, participants judged the likelihood that they would 
experience each of the eight events using the same 7-point likelihood scale 
they had used to make their peer-risk judgments. 
All participants in each session were randomly assigned either to the 
negative-events (n = 20), positive-events (n = 18), or neutral-events (n = 
30) condition. In the negative-events condition, the eight events were as 
follows: becoming alcoholic, being injured in a car crash, developing 
cancer, having one’s home burglarized, buying a car that turns out to be a 
lemon, having a heart attack by the age of 40, getting fired from a job, and 
suffering a broken bone. In the positive-events condition, the eight events 
were as follows: having a long and happy marriage, getting a desirable 
postgraduate job, graduating in the top 25% of one’s class, having an 
intellectually gifted child, living past the age of 80, earning a six-figure 
income by the age of 30, owning a home, and having one’s work 
recognized with an award. In the neutral-events condition, the eight events 
were as follows: living in a town with fewer than 50,000 people, having 
exactly two children, working for a relative, owning a turtle, owning a 
white car, traveling to Idaho, subscribing to a magazine, and painting a 
picture. A pilot study (n = 14) in which all 24 of these events were rated 
on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely negative, 2 = somewhat negative, 3 = 
slightly negative, 4 = neutral, 5 = slightly positive, 6 = somewhat 
positive, 7 = extremely positive) confirmed that the negative events 
were perceived as quite negative (M = 1.38, SD = 0.44), the positive 
events were perceived as quite positive (M = 6.44, SD = 0.29), and 
the neutral events were perceived as relatively neutral (M = 4.33, SD 
= 0.30). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 shows the mean likelihood judgment as a function of 
the logarithm of the group size separately for each event type 
condition. It appears that there was a positive group size effect for 
all three event types. Again, for each participant, we regressed the 
four mean likelihood judgments onto the logarithm of the group 
size, obtaining a regression coefficient for each participant. The 
overall mean regression coefficient was significantly greater than 
0 (M = 0.26, SD = 0.38), t(67) = 5.52, p < .05. A two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the regression coefficients, with 
event type (negative, positive, and neutral) and order (groups first 
vs. groups last) as between-subject variables, did not reveal a 
statistically significant main effect of event type, F(2, 62) = 0.94, 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean peer-likelihood judgments as a function of the logarithm 
of the group size for Experiment 3 for negative, positive, and neutral 
events. The stimuli were photographs of real peers. The likelihood 
judgments were made on a 7-point verbal scale. 
 
 
ns. This entire pattern of significant and nonsignificant results was 
replicated when the analysis excluded individual peer-risk 
judgments. Taken together, these results seem inconsistent 
with the person-positivity theory of the group size effect, because 
that explanation predicts a reverse group size effect for positive 
events and no group size effect for negative events. They 
also seem inconsistent with the affective theory, because, 
although it predicts a group size effect for positive events, it 
predicts no group size effect for neutral events. These results 
are consistent, however, with the numerosity theory. 
The ANOVA described previously also failed to reveal a 
statistically significant effect of judgment order, F(1, 62) = 0.08, 
ns. Thus, unlike in Experiment 1, the group size effect was roughly 
the same regardless of whether participants made judgments about 
the groups before making judgments about the individuals or 
vice versa. It seems plausible that this has to do with the relatively 
small number of individual peer judgments that they made. In 
Experiment 1, there were 30 stimulus individuals, the same 
individuals who made up the groups of 5, 10, and 15. For this 
reason, participants in the groups-last condition, which showed 
no group size effect, always made judgments about groups whose 
individual members they had already seen and made judgments 
about. Again, this might have encouraged them to make their 
group judgments by recalling and averaging the individual peer 
judgments that they had already made. In the present 
experiment, however, only 5 stimulus individuals were a small 
subset of the group members. For this reason, participants in 
the groups-last condition in this experiment, which did show a 
group size effect, made judgments about groups whose individual 
members they mostly had not seen before. This might have 
discouraged them from recalling and averaging their previous 
individual peer judgments and encouraged them to make more 
holistic group-risk judgments. 
An especially interesting pattern of results emerges when we 
consider how comparative optimism—the difference between 
peer-risk and self-risk judgments— changes as a function of group 
size. Not surprisingly, participants judged negative events to be 
less likely to happen to themselves (M = 2.68, SD = 0.76) than to 
other individuals, t(19) = 7.66, p < .05. This means that, again, 
participants were comparatively optimistic even when comparing 
themselves with individual peers, and that they became more 
comparatively optimistic as the size of the comparison group 
increased. Also not surprisingly, given previous research on 
comparative optimism for positive events, participants judged 
positive events to be more likely to happen to themselves (M = 
4.79, SD = 0.75) than to other individuals, t(17) = 3.65, p < .05, 
although this effect was weaker than the effect for negative 
events. However, because they judged larger groups to be more 
likely to experience positive events, the degree to which 
participants were comparatively optimistic actually decreased as 
the size of the comparison group increased. Their peer 
judgments for the group of 15 were still significantly lower 
than their self-judgments, t(17) = 2.55, p < .05. These results 
suggest that group size effect is likely an important reason why 
comparative optimism for positive events is weaker and less 
reliable than for negative events (Hoorens, 1996; Weinstein, 
1980). People judge themselves to be more likely than individual 
peers to experience positive events, but the effect of increasing 
the size of the comparison group actually works to counteract 
this comparative optimism by making their peers seem more 
likely to experience the positive events. 
With neutral events, participants’ self-judgments (M = 3.43, 
SD = 0.94) were not statistically significantly different from their 
individual peer judgments, t(19) = 1.12, ns. This lends additional 
support to our assumption that the neutral events were indeed 
neutral. However, because again their peer judgments increased as 
a function of comparison group size, participants judged the 
average member of a group of 15 to be significantly more likely 
than themselves to experience the neutral events, t(29) = 4.40, p 
< .05. This is a particularly interesting result because it cannot 
sensibly be called comparative optimism or comparative 
pessimism. In- stead, it appears to be an entirely non-motivated 
effect of the size of the comparison group. It is the group size 
effect in its purest form. 
Figure 4 presents the mean similarity judgment as a function of 
the logarithm of the group size separately for each event type. 
Although not highly pertinent to our major concerns, there appears 
to have been a main effect of event type on the similarity 
judgments, with participants judging the comparison target to be 
relatively similar to themselves in the positive condition and 
relatively dissimilar to themselves in the negative condition. 
A repeated measures ANOVA, with group size as the within-
subjects factor and both event type and judgment order as 
between-subjects factors, confirmed that there was a statistically 
significant effect of event type, F(2, 62) = 3.35, p < .05. This is 
not an effect of the comparison targets themselves, which were 
exactly the same across the three event-type conditions but an 
effect of the judgments that participants made. Compared with 
thinking about neutral events, thinking about the possibility of 
good things happening to the comparison target increased the 
perceived similarity of the target to the self. Thinking about 
the possibility of bad things happening to the comparison target 
decreased the perceived similarity of the target to the self. 
Turning to the effect of group size, the first thing to notice is that 
if there is a trend in the data, it is toward greater perceived 
similarity of the groups to the self than other individuals to the self. 
This is in direct opposition to the usual theoretical assumptions 
behind the person-positivity bias (e.g., Miller & Felicio, 1990; 
Sears, 1983), adding to the evidence against it as an explanation of 
the group size effect. This result could be interpreted, however, as 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean similarity judgments as a function of the logarithm of the 
group size for Experiment 3 for negative, positive, and neutral events. The 
stimuli were photographs of real peers. The similarity judgments were 
made on a 6-point verbal scale. 
 
 
a group size effect on the similarity judgments. For consistency, 
we tested for such an effect using the same regression procedure 
we used for the likelihood judgments. The overall mean regression 
coefficient was greater than 0 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.10), t(67) = 
5.38, p < .05, and an ANOVA revealed no effects of either event 
type, F(2, 62) = 2.06, ns, or judgment order, F(1, 62) = 0.36, ns 
Although these results suggest a group size effect on participants’ 
similarity judgments, we found that when we eliminated the 
individual peer judgments from the analysis, the effect became 
much smaller and nonsignificant. The overall mean regression 
coefficient (M = 0.02, SD = 0.14) was not significantly greater 
than 0, t(67) = 1.25, p = .21. This suggests that, rather than a 
group size effect, the effect on similarity judgments might be an 
effect of the comparison target’s being an individual versus a 
group regardless of the group size. For example, participants 
might have been more likely to categorize groups than 
individuals as “young adults” or “college students,” categories to 
which the participants themselves belonged, thus enhancing the 
perceived similarity of the average group member to themselves. 
 
Experiment 4 
The available evidence seems most consistent with the 
numerosity theory of the group size effect. That is, it seems most 
consistent with the idea that people’s judgments are influenced in 
a fairly direct way by the total number of stimulus individuals. 
However, although we have ruled out selective memory for high- 
risk individuals and high-risk features—the judgments in 
Experiments 1 through 3 were not memory based—we have not 
ruled out the possibility of selective attention to high-risk 
individuals and high-risk features. In other words, instead of 
integrating the total number of stimulus individuals with their 
judgments, people might be integrating the number of high-risk 
individuals or high-risk features with their judgments. In 
Experiments 4 and 5, we pit the numerosity theory against these 
two alternatives. 
The numerosity theory clearly implies that the group size effect 
should not depend on variability among the individuals in terms of 
their perceived risk. The high-risk individual interpretation, by 
contrast, requires that some of the individuals be perceived at 
higher risk than others so that judgments can be influenced 
specifically by the number of high-risk individuals. Another 
implication of the numerosity theory is that the group size effect 
should not depend on the individuals having any discernible 
features. The high-risk feature theory, by contrast, requires that 
the individuals have discernible features so that judgments can be 
influenced specifically by the number of high-risk features. Thus, 
if the stimulus individuals were, for example, identical stick 
figures with no discernible risk-relevant features, the 
numerosity theory pre- dicts that there should still be a group 
size effect. People should still integrate the total number of stick 
figures with their risk judgments. This is why in Experiment 4 
the stimulus individuals were identical stick figures. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 40 undergraduate students at 
CSUF. They participated as part of an introductory psychology course 
requirement. 
Design and procedure. We created 16 stimulus displays, 4 each con- 
taining 1, 5, 10, and 15 stick figures. Above each display were instructions 
stating that the stick figures represented randomly selected CSUF students 
along with a question asking for a judgment of the risk that the typical 
student in the group would experience one of four negative events: 
developing heart disease, being hurt in a car crash, dropping out of 
college, or being fired from a job. Each group size was paired once with 
each negative event  to  produce  the  16  different  displays.  We  also  
varied  the  major department from which the students were said to have 
been drawn: psychology, chemistry, math, or sociology. We included this 
variable only to disguise our true hypothesis, so we did not combine it 
factorially with the other  independent  variables.  Instead, we  created  two  
different  sets  of stimulus displays in which the major departments were 
paired with the group sizes and the events in different ways. We then 
combined the 16 displays into a questionnaire with one display per 
page. Each page also included a numerical risk scale ranging from 1 
(extremely low risk) to 9 (extremely high risk). The order of the displays 
was randomized separately for each participant. 
Participants were tested in non-interacting groups of approximately 
10. Each participant was given a questionnaire that began with a set of 
instructions explaining the task. They then completed the questionnaire at 
their own pace, circling the number on the rating scale that corresponded 
to their risk judgment for each stimulus display. 
 
Results and Discussion 
For each participant, we computed the mean risk judgment 
across events for the groups of 1, 5, 10, and 15. The means of these 
four mean risk judgments are shown in Figure 5 as a function of 
the logarithm of the group size. Again, there appears to have been 
a roughly logarithmic group size effect. For each participant, we 
obtained a regression coefficient by regressing the four mean risk 
judgments onto the logarithm of the group size. The mean of these 
regression coefficients was 0.36 (SD = 0.71), which is 
significantly greater than 0, t(39) = 3.20, p < .05. Again, this 
group size effect remained even when displays containing 
individual stick figures were eliminated from the analysis. 
Although this result seems inconsistent with both the idea of 
selective attention to high-risk individuals and high-risk features, 
it is entirely consistent with the numerosity theory. 
 
Experiment 5 
As we have presented it, the numerosity theory is quite general. 
There is no reason that the judgment has to be about risk or 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean peer-risk judgments as a function of the logarithm of the 
group size for Experiment 4. The stimuli were stick figures said to 
represent randomly selected peers. The risk judgments were made on a 
9-point numerical scale. 
 
 
likelihood; it could be about almost any quantity. This follows 
from research on both the numerosity heuristic (Pelham et al., 
1994) and basic anchoring (Wilson et al., 1996). In the former, 
stimulus numerosity has been shown to affect a variety of 
conceptual, perceptual, and social judgments (Pelham et al., 
1994). In the latter, an irrelevant number presented before 
participants make frequency judgments has been shown to be 
integrated into those frequency judgments. Furthermore, research 
on basic anchoring in particular suggests that the effect is 
unconscious, automatic, and not easily debiased. 
To explore the generality of the group size effect, therefore, we 
presented participants with sets of stick figures, much as in 
Experiment 4. However, the quantity to be judged was not the 
likelihood of experiencing a negative event, which is an abstract 
quantity that must be inferred. Instead, it was the height of the stick 
figures themselves, a concrete quantity that is perceived directly. 
Nevertheless, according to the numerosity theory, the judged height 
of the average stick figure should increase as a function of the 
number of stick figures in the stimulus display. Again, this is 
because the numerosity theory is that people automatically integrate 
the number of distinct stimulus elements with their quantitative 
judgments about that stimulus. In this case, they integrate the 
number of stick figures with their judgments of the average height 
of the stick figures. 
The switch from risk and likelihood judgments to height 
judgments also allows us to test two alternative interpretations 
of the group size effect. One is that as the group size increases, it 
becomes increasingly easy for people to imagine the negative 
event happening to one or more individuals in the group. If a 
person thinks that the base rate of being injured in a car crash is 
25%, then he or she might assume that it is unlikely to happen to 
any particular individual, or even to the typical member of a group 
of two or three, because it is difficult to conceptualize 25% of such 
a small group. The person might also assume that being hurt in a 
car crash is more likely to happen to the typical member of a larger 
group because it is easier to conceptualize 25% of that group (e.g., 
one person out of four). With height judgments, however, there is 
no need to conceptualize any fraction of the group. Every individ- 
ual has some height that can be perceived directly, and these 
heights simply need to be averaged across all group members 
regardless of whether the group is small or large. A group size 
effect on height judgments, therefore, would rule out this 
alternative interpretation. 
A second alternative interpretation is that participants in our studies 
are simply misunderstanding their task. They interpret our instruction 
to judge the risk of the average person in the group to mean that they 
are to judge the risk that the event will happen to at least one person 
in the group, a quantity that does increase as a function of group size. 
However, there is no equivalent misunderstanding for height judg- 
ments. The only remote possibilities would be to mistakenly judge the 
likelihood that at least one group member is tall or to mistakenly judge 
the height of the tallest group member. Given that participants are 
asked specifically to judge the height of the average group member, 
however, both of these misunderstandings seem highly implausible. 
 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 55 introductory psychology stu- 
dents at CSUF. They participated in partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement. 
Design and procedure. We created 18 different stimulus displays, each 
consisting of 1, 4, 8, or 12 stick figures. The 18 displays included four 
distinct subsets. Each of the first two subsets consisted of four displays of 
1, 4, 8, and 12 stick figures. In Subset A all the stick figures were 4.52 cm 
tall and in Subset B they were all 4.90 cm tall. We refer to these as the 
nonvariable subsets because all the stick figures within each subset were 
the same height. Each of the second two subsets consisted of five displays: 
two had 1 stick figure and the other three had 4, 8, or 12 stick figures. In 
Subset C, half the stick figures were 4.09 cm tall and half were 4.95 cm tall, 
so that their mean height equaled the height of the stick figures in Subset 
A. In Subset D half the stick figures were 4.47 cm tall and half were 5.33 
cm tall so that their mean height equaled the height of stick figures in 
Subset B. We refer to these as the variable sets because the heights of the 
stick figures varied within them. In the upper left corner of each display 
was a legend with a vertical line 0.84 cm long that was said to represent 1 
ft. This vertical line was used by participants as a standard for judging the 
heights of the stick figures in feet and inches. We photocopied the 18 
stimulus displays onto overhead transparencies for presentation much as in 
Experiments 1 through 3. 
Participants were tested in noninteracting groups of approximately 5 to 
10 in a classroom on the university campus. They were informed that they 
would be judging the height of the average stick figure in each of several 
displays in feet and inches. They were presented with two sample displays 
to introduce them to the task and the use of the standard for making their 
judgments. One sample display was similar to those that they would make 
judgments about, and the other showed an array of six stick figures that, 
according to the standard, ranged in height from 6 feet 6 in. to 4 ft. Half the 
participants then saw the 18 displays in a fixed order, in which displays 
from Sets A through D and with group sizes of 1 through 12 were 
thoroughly mixed. The rest saw the 18 displays in the reverse order. For 
each display, participants wrote their judgments on a separate response 
sheet in feet and inches. 
 
Results 
One participant was dropped from the analyses for giving 
responses that were difficult to interpret in the context of the task, 
so the following analyses are based on the responses of 54 
participants. We began by converting all the height judgments 
from feet and inches to inches (e.g., 5 feet, 4 in. = 64 in.). 
Then, for each participant, we computed the mean height 
judgment across the six individual stick figures and across the 
groups of 4, 8, and 12. Figure 6 presents the means of these 
four mean height judgments 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean height judgments as a function of the logarithm of the 
group size for Experiment 5. The stimuli were stick figures. The height 
judgments were made in feet and inches (converted to inches) relative to a 
standard line said to represent 1 ft. 
 
 
as a function of the logarithm of the group size and shows a clear 
group size effect. (Again, the standard deviations are presented in 
Table 1.) As always, we regressed the four mean judgments onto 
the logarithm of the group size, obtaining a regression coefficient 
for each participant. The mean regression coefficient (M = 3.49, 
SD = 2.67) was significantly greater than 0, t(53) = 9.58, p < .05, 
and this effect remained even when the height judgments for the 
individuals were excluded from the analysis. 
Another interesting question is whether the group size effect is 
observed when the analysis is limited to the nonvariable stimulus 
sets. If so, this would indicate that the effect does not depend on 
people attending to particularly tall individuals. In fact, this ap- 
pears to be the case. When the analysis was limited to the 
nonvariable stimulus sets, the mean regression coefficient (M = 
3.65, SD = 2.97) was greater than 0 by about the same degree as 
for all the stimulus sets, t(53) = 9.03, p < .05. This argues 
against explanations that rely on selective attention to extreme 
features or individuals. Instead, what seems to be driving the 
group size effect is the sheer number of individuals in the 
display. 
 
General Discussion 
We now return to the three major goals of the present research: 
generalizing the group size effect, showing that it affects compar- 
ative optimism, and making some theoretical headway. Ultimately, 
we consider the implications of the group size effect for social 
judgment more generally. 
 
Generalizing the Group Size Effect 
The experiments presented here show very clearly that risk 
judgments about the average member of a group increase as a 
function of the number of individuals in the group and that this 
group size effect is observed under a wide variety of conditions. 
The group size effect occurs for many different negative events but 
also for positive and neutral events. It occurs whether the stimulus 
individuals are written descriptions (Price, 2001) or, as shown 
here, photographs of real peers or stick-figure representations of 
peers. It also occurs for both absolute peer-risk judgments and for 
direct comparative judgments of one’s own risk relative to that of 
the average group member. There is evidence that the group size 
effect generalizes beyond risk and likelihood judgments even to 
perceptually based height judgments. Furthermore, the function 
relating group size to judged risk tends to be negatively accelerated 
and reasonably well approximated by a logarithmic curve. The 
only notable exception to this pattern was that participants who 
made a long series of risk judgments about individual peers before 
making risk judgments about the average member of different size 
groups did not show a group size effect in Experiment 1.4 We 
suspect that this is because these participants used an alternative 
strategy to make their group-risk judgments, recalling and men- 
tally averaging the individual-risk judgments they had already 
made. 
 
The Group Size Effect and Comparative Optimism 
In the present experiments, the degree of comparative optimism 
was quite clearly affected by comparison group size. Given the 
apparent generality of the group size effect, we suggest that it is 
plausible that the typical comparative optimism effect reported in 
the literature is also in part a group size effect. We do so, however, 
with a few caveats. 
First, this conclusion seems stronger when applied to 
comparative optimism measured using the indirect method than 
using the direct method. Most of the experiments here used 
the indirect method, in part because a group size effect is clearly 
predicted for this method. As the size of the comparison group 
increases, absolute risk judgments about the average member of 
that comparison group should increase, whereas absolute risk 
judgments about the self should remain constant (because the self 
is always a group of one). However, the one experiment here that 
used the direct method also showed a group size effect, although 
this effect was weaker than the experiments that used the indirect 
method. Given that many researchers have proposed that direct 
comparative judgments are essentially absolute self-judgments 
(Eiser et al., 2001; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Kruger, 1999; 
Price et al., 2002), further research is warranted to establish a 
group size effect on direct comparative risk judgments. If 
people consistently show a group size effect, then this suggests 
that they must be attending to at least one feature of the 
comparison group. 
Second, in the typical comparative optimism study, the 
comparison group is simply defined verbally. For example, 
participants might be asked to judge the risk of “the average 
student at your university” (e.g., Price et al., 2002; Weinstein, 
1980). In the present experiments, the comparison groups 
consisted of photo- graphs of actual peers in which the 
numerosity of the group was highly salient. Although the 
comparison groups in the research of Price (2001) consisted of 
written descriptions of individuals as opposed to photographs, 
numerosity was still relatively salient because the individuals 
were described one at a time. It is possible, therefore, that the 
group size effect contributes to comparative optimism only 
when the numerosity of the comparison group is highly salient. 
This is related to the first caveat. It is possible that direct 
comparative risk judgments showed a group size effect here only 
because the comparison groups were so salient. If they were less 
salient, then perhaps people would ignore them and make 
comparative risk judgments that were, in essence, absolute self- 
risk judgments. 
The third caveat is related to the first two but is more general. 
It is important to emphasize that the group size effect is an effect 
on peer-risk judgments, not on self-risk judgments (again, because 
such judgments are always about a group of one). So the increase 
in  comparative  optimism  observed  here  is  due  entirely  to  an 
increase in peer-risk judgments, not a decrease in self-risk 
judgments. One could argue, therefore, that the present results 
have few or no implications for understanding risk-taking 
behavior. After all, people’s willingness to engage in a risky 
behavior should not 
 
 
4 Another exception is that a pilot study failed to reveal a group size 
effect on grade point average (GPA) judgments with photographic stimuli. 
This same pilot study, however, did reveal a statistically significant group 
size effect on height judgments and weight judgments and a nonsignificant 
trend toward a group size effect on weekly income judgments. Given that 
the GPA results represent one of very few failures to replicate the group 
size effect, it might just represent sampling error. An alternative explana- 
tion is that it reflects a fairly obvious boundary condition of the group size 
effect: People’s judgments will not be influenced by group size when they 
already have well-formed beliefs about the quantity in question. 
 
 
depend on judgments of their peers’ risk but on judgments of their 
own risk. However, there is evidence that the perception of others’ 
risk can have an effect on how people interpret their own risk. 
Specifically, Klein (1997) found that people reported that they 
would be more disturbed to learn that they had a genetic marker for 
a pancreatic disease when their chances of developing the disease 
were a higher-than-average 30% than when their chances were a 
lower-than-average 60% (see also Windschitl, Martin, & Flugstad, 
2002, for a closely related result). Thus, if group size influences 
the perception of others’ risk, then it might also influence the 
extent to which people are concerned about their own risk and 
perhaps their likelihood of taking protective action. 
 
Explaining the Group Size Effect 
The present results rule out many potential explanations of the 
group size effect. They argue against the person-positivity and 
affective theories of the group size effect. Because the person- 
positivity theory assumes that the average member of a larger 
group is perceived as less similar to the self than the average 
member of a smaller group and, therefore, is liked less, it implies 
a reverse group size effect for positive events. The average 
member of a larger group should be judged to be less likely to 
experience positive events. The person-positivity theory also 
implies no group size effect for neutral events because how much 
one likes a target should be irrelevant to such nonevaluative 
judgments. Yet both of these predictions were disconfirmed in 
Experiment 3, which also showed that people judged 
themselves to be more similar to the average member of a group 
than to other individuals, not less as predicted by the person-
positivity theory. The affective theory predicts a group size 
effect for both negative and positive events but not for neutral 
events. However, we observed an effect for neutral events in 
Experiment 3 of roughly the same magnitude as for negative and 
positive events. In addition, neither of these theories predicts the 
group size effect on judgments of the heights of stick figures 
observed in Experiment 5. 
The present results also argue against most of the cognitive 
theories considered here. It is clear that any model that relies on 
selective memory cannot work because the group size effect is 
observed for online risk judgments. It also seems clear that any 
model that relies on selective attention to high-risk individuals or 
high-risk features cannot work because of the results of 
Experiments 4 and 5. In both of these experiments, the stimuli 
were stick figures. They had no discernible features, and there 
were no particularly high-risk individuals in Experiment 4 or 
particularly tall individuals in the nonvariable conditions of 
Experiment 5. Experiment 5 also argues against the idea that 
people make higher risk judgments for larger groups because 
they are better able to imagine the negative event happening to 
at least one individual as the group size increases, and it argues 
against the idea that participants misunderstand their task as that 
of judging the risk that the event will happen to at least one 
individual in the group. Neither of these interpretations is 
consistent with the effect on height judgments in Experiment 5. 
The best explanation of the group size effect is the numerosity 
theory. The group size effect is the result of a simple, general 
cognitive mechanism that integrates stimulus numerosity with 
quantitative judgments about that stimulus. This is the only theory 
that predicted all the major results here. What precisely is the 
mechanism underlying the numerosity theory, and how does it 
operate? Recall that one possibility is that it is another example of 
people using a numerosity heuristic (Pelham et al., 1994). That is, 
they are overapplying the generally useful principle that stimulus 
numerosity is positively correlated with other quantitative 
dimensions of that stimulus. Although this might be a good 
functional description of the group size effect, we think it 
necessary to consider in more detail the cognitive processes 
that underlie it. Here we sketch our own proposal, which draws 
on two lines of research: (a) research on the representation and 
processing of numerosity and event frequency and (b) research 
on basic anchoring. 
First, we assume that the processing of stimulus numerosity 
occurs fairly automatically, without counting, and results in a 
modality-independent representation. The first part of this 
assumption is consistent with research on the representation of 
numerosity in infants and nonhuman animals, who reliably 
distinguish between collections of objects and events with 
different numerosities (e.g., 6 vs. 12; see Feigenson, Dehaene, 
& Spelke, 2004, for a review). It is also consistent with 
research showing that the processing of event frequency 
information is automatic (e.g., Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979). The second part is consistent with research in 
which adults make cross-modal comparisons between the numer- 
osity  of,  for  example,  a  spatial  array  of  dots  and  a  temporal 
sequence of tones. Such cross-modal comparisons are essentially 
as accurate as comparisons made within the same sense modality, 
suggesting that they rely on modality-independent representations 
of  numerosity  (Barth,  Kanwisher,  &  Spelke,  2003).  This  is  a 
particularly important point if a single theory is to account for the 
present results and the results of Price (2001), in which group 
members were distributed across time rather than space. We also 
assume, given the form of the group size effect, that the represen- 
tation of numerosity is based on a negatively accelerated psycho- 
physical function. This assumption is consistent with considerable 
research on the psychophysics of numerosity and temporal fre- 
quency perception (e.g., Feigenson et al., 2004; Hintzman, 1988; 
Krueger, 1982; van Oeffelen & Vos, 1982). Thus, when people 
make judgments about the average or typical group member, they 
have an active representation of the group size, and this represen- 
tation is a negatively accelerated function of the actual group size. 
How and why is group size information integrated into judg- 
ments about the typical or average individual? Again, we believe 
that the literature on basic anchoring, in which people’s quantita- 
tive judgments are biased by an irrelevant number presented be- 
forehand, suggests an answer. Wilson et al. (1996) proposed that 
such effects might be the result of numeric priming. A represen- 
tation of the anchor value becomes activated and integrated with 
the subsequent judgment. They liken this process to other well- 
known priming effects on social judgment, in which, for example, 
judgments of a person are assimilated to an arbitrary trait category 
that has been activated (e.g., Higgins, 1996). It is true that basic 
anchoring effects can be difficult to obtain when the anchor value 
is completely without meaning for participants and is processed at 
a minimal level (Brewer & Chapman, 2002). However, in the 
group size effect paradigm, the anchor value (i.e., the group size) 
is probably processed automatically, is meaningful (even if irrel- 
evant for the judgment at hand), and is a property of the stimulus 
itself (as opposed to a completely unrelated number). All of these 
factors might contribute to people having an active and phenom- 
 
 
enologically relevant representation of group size that they 
integrate into their judgments about the average or typical group 
member. 
Given these theoretical assumptions, it is worth asking whether 
there are conditions under which we would not expect a group size 
effect. There are some obvious possibilities. One is that there may 
be situations in which the group size is not salient enough to 
produce an active representation. As suggested previously, this 
might be the case when the group size is merely implied. For 
example, asking participants to judge the risk of the average 
student in an introductory psychology lecture (a large group) 
versus a discussion or recitation section (a much smaller group) 
might not produce a group size effect because participants might 
not bother to think about the group size. Also, consistent with other 
research on conceptual and affective priming (e.g., Higgins, 1996; 
Martin, 2000; Schwarz, 1990), there might be no group size effect 
when participants can attribute their intuitive sense of numerosity 
to its actual source. For example, merely counting the group 
members might be enough to allow participants to attribute their 
intuitive sense of numerosity to the size of the group. This, in turn, 
might prevent them from integrating this intuitive sense of 
numerosity into their judgment. 
A final theoretical point is that our focus has been on explaining 
the group size effect on risk judgments. Our claim that affective 
processes do not underlie the group size effect should not be taken 
as a claim that they do not underlie risk judgments in general. In 
fact, the latter claim would clearly run counter to the well- 
supported “affect heuristic” (Slovic et al., 2002) and “risk as 
feelings” (Loewenstein et al., 2001) perspectives on risk 
perception. The same goes for the other kinds of explanations 
that we have considered. Our doubts that attention to specific 
features of the stimulus individuals or attention to specific 
individuals under- lies the group size effect are not doubts that 
these processes underlie risk judgments in general. When 
making risk judgments about individuals, our participants did not 
make the same judgment for all of them. They clearly made 
distinctions based on their sex, style of dress, and other personal 
characteristics (see also Price, 2001). Although it remains to be 
determined what other cues people are using when they judge 
the likelihood that the average person in a group will someday 
own a turtle, it seems clear that they are using group size. 
 
Implications for Social Judgment 
Although we have established the group size effect most clearly 
in the domain of risk judgment, there is good reason to believe that 
it should be observed in other areas of social judgment. First, there 
is the fact that there was a group size effect on likelihood 
judgments for positive and neutral events in Experiment 3 and a 
group size effect on height judgments in Experiment 5. Second, 
previous research has shown what are essentially group size 
effects on a variety of conceptual, perceptual, and social 
judgments (Pelham et al., 1994; see also Wilson et al., 1996). A 
general hypothesis for future research, then, is that the average 
or typical member of a larger group is judged to have more of 
whatever quantity is under consideration, especially when the 
judgment is made quickly and intuitively, and no other more 
rational strategy is readily available (as in the groups-last 
condition of Experiment 1). The average member of a larger 
group might be judged friendlier, sneakier, 
more intelligent, and more neurotic than the average member of a 
smaller group. 
A particularly interesting question arises when the quantity in 
question can be defined such that either end of the scale is the 
positive end. For example, it is easy to think about people in terms 
of how honest they are, but it is also easy to think of them in terms 
of how dishonest they are. Would the average member of a larger 
group be judged both more honest and more dishonest than the 
average member of a smaller group? There is a precedent for this 
kind of effect. Downs and Shafir (1999) found that people about 
whom we have more information (i.e., famous celebrities) are 
judged to be both more honest and more dishonest than people 
about whom we have less information (i.e., less famous 
celebrities). Their explanation for this effect, however, relies on 
selective memory for characteristics or behaviors that are 
consistent with a judgment toward the positive end of the scale. 
When we have more information about a target person, we 
recall both more honest characteristics and behaviors and more 
dishonest ones. Note that this explanation is actually similar to 
the high-risk feature frequency and high-risk individual 
frequency models presented earlier. If the group size effect can 
be shown to follow this pattern, with the average member of 
larger groups being judged both more honest and more dishonest, 
it would be important to consider more carefully the parallels 
between the group size effect and the effect reported by Downs 
and Shafir. 
 
Other Perspectives on Differences Between Judgments 
About Individuals and Groups 
People reason differently about specific versus general cases in 
a variety of contexts (Sherman & McConnell, 1996), and 
differences between judgments about individuals and groups have 
been given special attention by social psychologists. Here we 
consider the relationship of our group size perspective on this 
issue to some other prominent perspectives. As will become 
clear, we see these not as competing explanations of our results 
but rather complementary perspectives that can lead to a 
deeper understanding of social judgment phenomena. 
Person-positivity bias. One alternative perspective is based on 
the person-positivity bias. Again, the fundamental assumptions of 
this perspective are that (a) we tend to evaluate individuals more 
favorably than groups because (b) we perceive them to be more 
similar to ourselves and therefore (c) like them more. Although we 
have already seen that this is not a viable explanation of the group 
size effect, this does not mean that the person-positivity bias 
perspective is not still valid and useful more generally. 
The first reason is that the person-positivity bias, as originally 
conceptualized by Sears (1983), is not only about individual-group 
discrepancies. He did propose that individuals are evaluated more 
positively than groups but also that individuals are evaluated more 
positively than their individual elements (e.g., personality traits) 
and more positively than other objects associated with them (e.g., 
college courses they have taught). So the group size perspective 
comes into conflict with only one part of Sears’s overall 
conception. The second reason is that there is nothing to indicate 
that the person-positivity bias could not coexist with the group 
size effect. For example, a teacher might evaluate individual 
students positively in part because he likes them (regardless 
of whether he perceives them as similar to himself). When he 
evaluates the class 
 
 
as a whole, however, this may not happen. At the same time, his 
evaluation of the class as a whole might be given a boost because 
of the sheer number of students. Depending on the specifics of the 
situation, these two effects might work together to produce an 
especially large difference between judgments about individuals 
and groups, or they might counteract each other. We think it 
possible that our procedure might have promoted a group size 
effect over a person-positivity bias because participants did not 
know the stimulus individuals and had very little information 
about them. This might have minimized their liking of them. 
Furthermore, group size tended to be a quite salient dimension of 
the comparison targets, which might have encouraged participants 
to take it into account. If participants had known more about the 
stimulus targets and if the group size were less salient, it is possible 
the person-positivity bias would have been more pronounced than 
the group size effect. 
Singular-target-focus theory. In an impressive series of 
articles, Klar, Giladi, and their colleagues (Klar, 2002; Klar & 
Giladi, 1997, 1999; Klar et al., 1996) have shown that almost 
any individual in a group is judged to be better than the group 
average when the group members have a favorable standing on 
the dimension of judgment. For example, college students judge a 
randomly selected member of a small group of peers to be 
friendlier than the average group member (Klar, 2002). 
Similarly, almost any individual is judged to be worse than 
the group average when the group members generally have an 
unfavorable standing on the dimension of judgment. For 
example, although people judge a randomly selected person 
from a self-generated list of pleasant acquaintances to be more 
pleasant than the average list member, they judge a randomly 
selected person from a list of unpleasant people to be less 
pleasant than average (Klar, 2002). Klar et al. explain these 
nonselective superiority and inferiority biases with their 
singular-target-focus theory. They assume that people do not 
sufficiently take into account the comparison group when making 
their judgments. Instead, they focus on the individual, judging him 
or her to be better than average to the extent that he or she is good 
and worse than average to the extent that he or she is bad, 
according to some more general standard. 
An important boundary condition of the singular-target-focus 
perspective is that it applies only to direct comparative judgments, 
a point that Klar et al. emphasize throughout their work (e.g., Klar, 
2002). The reason is that indirect comparative judgments require a 
separate judgment about a comparison group, making it impossible 
to ignore it. When asked to judge how friendly Frances is relative 
to a group of college students, I might be able to focus on 
Frances’s friendliness and ignore her peers, therefore judging her 
to be friendlier than average. However, when asked to make 
separate judgments about Frances and her peers, I am forced to 
consider the fact that, yes, Frances is friendly, but her peers are 
friendly too. For this reason, the singular-target-focus theory is 
silent on the relationship between comparative judgments about 
individuals and groups when those judgments are made using the 
indirect method. 
The simplest integration of the singular-target-focus perspective 
and our group size perspective, therefore, is that the former applies 
to direct comparative judgments and the latter to indirect 
comparative judgments. Of course, this is too simple. One reason 
is that, as we saw in Experiment 3, comparison group size can 
influence direct comparative risk judgments, although perhaps 
not to the 
same extent as it influences absolute peer-risk judgments. Thus, at 
least under some conditions, people’s direct comparative 
judgments are sensitive to comparison group size. A second 
reason is that the category of direct comparative judgments 
could include judgments about a small group relative to a larger 
one. For exam- ple, a teacher might judge the quality of her 
current class of students relative to all the students she has 
taught. Although she might be relatively more focused on her 
current class than on her past students, we would also expect her 
to be influenced by the size of her current class. Like the person-
positivity perspective, then, we believe that there is no reason that 
the singular-target-focus and group size perspectives cannot 
peacefully coexist. 
Stereotypes.   A third, and even broader, perspective on differ- 
ences between judgments about individuals and judgments about 
groups comes from a long tradition of research on stereotypes. The 
consensus of this research is that people can have stereotypes 
about social groups, which they do not necessarily apply to indi- 
vidual group members (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & 
Spencer, 2003). This might result, for example, in our believing 
that college students are heavy drinkers even though we would not 
judge any particular college student of our acquaintance to be a 
heavy  drinker.  Likewise,  we  might  judge  the  average  college 
student to be at relatively high risk of becoming an alcoholic, but 
we might not judge any particular college student to be at high risk. 
We should consider briefly whether this basic idea might ex- 
plain the group size effect. Certainly, our stimulus individuals 
belonged to social groups for which people have stereotypes (e.g., 
college students, young adults). Furthermore, it is possible that 
these stereotypes were increasingly likely to be activated, or par- 
ticipants were increasingly likely to apply them (or weight them 
more heavily), as the group size increased. For example, an indi- 
vidual college student might be unlikely to activate our stereotype 
of college students, so we would not judge him or her to be at 
particularly high risk for becoming alcoholic. A group of three or 
five college students, however, might be somewhat more likely to 
activate our stereotype, so we would judge them to be at somewhat 
higher risk. The main argument against this explanation is that to 
produce the pattern of results observed here, the activated stereo- 
type would have to include the belief that group members are at 
elevated risk for a wide variety of negative events. It does not seem 
plausible that the stereotype of college students includes the belief 
that they are at an elevated risk for developing cancer or getting 
divorced, for example. Although many of the positive events we 
used in Experiment 4 might be part of the college student stereo- 
type (e.g., earning a high income), the neutral events seem unlikely 
to be (e.g., owning a turtle). It is also worth noting that in the 
research of Price (2001) the stimulus individuals were described 
only by lists of risk factors for heart disease, and they did not 
clearly belong to any particular stereotyped group. 
As with the person-positivity and singular-target-focus perspec- 
tives, however, we believe there is no inherent conflict between the 
stereotype perspective and the group size perspective, although 
there may be some interesting points of contact. Consider the 
question of whether group size does, in fact, affect whether a group 
stereotype is activated and applied. If so, then this would enhance 
the group size effect when the stereotype is consistent with having 
more of the quantity in question, as when judging the intelligence 
of college students. However, it would counteract the group size 
effect when the stereotype is consistent with having less of the 
 
 
quantity, as when judging the likelihood that college students will 
become construction workers. Another interesting question is 
whether the group size effect might contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of stereotypes. For example, when people think about 
college students’ tendency to drink alcohol, they are thinking about 
a large target group. As a result, they may tend to think that, on 
average, college students are heavy drinkers, so that this becomes 
a part of their stereotype or perhaps reconfirms a stereotype they 
already have. 
 
Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the present research raises at least as many 
questions as it answers. The questions that it answers, 
however, are important ones. Is the group size effect on risk 
judgments a general phenomenon? Yes. Does comparison group 
size contribute to comparative optimism? Yes, with the caveats 
noted previously. Does the group size effect generalize beyond 
the domain of risk judgments? Yes. At the same time, the 
questions that it raises have the potential to generate an 
abundance of new research and to provide insights into many 
social judgment phenomena. What are the detailed cognitive 
processes underlying the numerosity heuristic? What kind of 
social judgments are affected by group size and what kind are 
not? Why? When does group size contribute to self-
enhancement, and when does it run counter to it? How does 
group size interact with other variables (e.g., liking based on 
person positivity) to produce differences between judgments about 
individuals and judgments about groups? We look forward to more 
answers and, of course, new questions. 
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